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RATIONAL  LEARNING  LEADS TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
BY EHUD  KALAI AND  EHUD  LEHRER1 
Each of  n players, in an infinitely repeated  game, starts with subjective beliefs  about 
his opponents'  strategies. If the individual beliefs  are compatible with the true strategies 
chosen,  then  Bayesian  updating will lead  in the  long run to  accurate prediction of  the 
future play of  the  game.  It follows  that individual players, who  know their own  payoff 
matrices and choose  strategies  to  maximize their expected  utility, must eventually play 
according to a Nash  equilibrium of the  repeated  game. An  immediate corollary is that, 
when playing a Harsanyi-Nash equilibrium of a repeated game of incomplete information 
about opponents'  payoff matrices, players will eventually play a Nash equilibrium of the 
real game, as if they had complete  information. 
KEYWORDS: Repeated  games, Nash  equilibrium, rational learning, Bayesian learning, 
subjective equilibrium. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE  CONCEPT OF NASH  (1950)  EQUILIBRIUM has become central  in game theory, 
economics,  and other social sciences.  Yet the process  by which  the players  learn 
to play it, if they do, is not fully understood.  This is not surprising  for games 
played  only once where players  have no observations  to guide them and learning 
theories are restricted to  model thought processes. However, in  repeated 
interaction,  where the players  do have enough time to observe  the behavior  of 
their opponents,  one can hope to obtain a statistical  learning  theory that leads 
to Nash equilibrium. 
While some experimental  work  (see, for example,  Smith  (1990),  McCabe  et al. 
(1991),  Linhart  et al. (1989), Roth et al. (1991), and Prasnikar  and Roth (1992)) 
supports  the supposition  that agents in repeated games do learn to play Nash 
equilibrium,  no satisfactory  theoretical  explanation  for this phenomenon  exists. 
This is in spite of continuously  growing  game theoretic literature  on repeated 
games  with or without  complete information  (see Aumann  (1981), and Mertens 
(1987), for surveys that are already outdated; see  the forthcoming  book by 
Mertens et al. (1990), for state-of-the-art  knowledge on repeated games with 
and without complete information),  and the interest in the topic of learning 
in  economics (e.g., Blume et  al. (1982), Jordan (1985), Easley and Kiefer 
(1988), Bray and Kreps (1987), McLennan (1987), Grandmont  and Laroque 
(1990), Woodford  (1990), and references  therein). 
1The authors wish to thank Robert Aumann, Larry Blume, David Easley, Itzhak Gilboa, Sergiu 
Hart,  Martin Hellwig,  James  Jordan, Dov  Monderer,  Dov  Samet,  Sylvain Sorin, Vernon  Smith, 
Robert Wilson, and anonymous referees  for helpful discussions and suggestions. This research was 
partly supported by Grants Nos. SES-9011790 and SES-9022305 from the National Science Founda- 
tion,  Economics,  and by the  Department  of  Economics  and the  C. V.  Starr Center  for Applied 
Economics of New York University. 
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The construction  of processes  that converge  to Nash equilibrium  is not a new 
topic to game theorists.  Robinson  (1951), Miyasawa  (1961), and Shapley  (1964) 
studied convergence properties of  fictitious play. More recently, however, 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) recognized that such mechanisms  can be used 
as  a  basis to  model learning by players with bounded rationality, and a 
large literature on  the  subject has  developed. A  sample of  such papers 
includes:  Selten (1988), Crawford  (1989), Canning  (1992), Jordan  (1991, 1992), 
Brock et  al.  (1988), Milgrom and  Roberts (1991), Stanford (1991), and 
Fudenberg  and Levine  (1993a). 
Most of this literature,  however,  builds on assumptions  not applicable  to our 
subject  of repeated play among a small number  of subjectively  rational  agents. 
The dynamic  models studied  in this literature  are often ones of fictitious  play  or 
of random  matching  in a large population,  and the behavior  of the players  is 
often modeled to be "myopic"  or "bounded"  in other ways. For our players, 
this implies shortcomings  of the following  types. 
1. In trying  to predict  future  opponents'  behavior,  a boundedly  rational  player 
ignores the fact that his opponents are also engaged in a dynamic  learning 
process. 
2. A myopic player would not perform  a costly experiment  no matter how 
high the resulting  expected  future payoffs  are. 
3. A myopic  player  ignores strategic  considerations  regarding  the future.  For 
example, even if he believes his opponent in a repeated prisoners'  dilemma 
game is  playing a  trigger strategy (see  Example 2.1), his consideration  of 
immediate  payoff  may lead him to a choice of a long run inferior  action. 
In order to overcome these types of flaws, we take a traditional  decision 
theoretic  approach  to the problem.  We assume  that the players  are engaged  in a 
standard  perfect-monitoring  infinitely  repeated game with discounting.  Thus, 
each one possesses a fixed matrix  which specifies his payoff for every action 
combination  taken  by the group  of players.  In every  period every  player  chooses 
his individual  action, and the vector of chosen actions, through  the individual 
payoff matrices, determines the  period payoffs for all the  players. Perfect 
monitoring  means  that before making  the choice of a period's  action,  the player 
is informed  of all the previous  actions taken. Each player  possesses a discount 
factor that he uses in evaluating  future payoffs.  His goal is to maximize  the 
present  value of his total expected  payoff. 
The players are assumed to be subjectively  rational in the following sense. 
Each one starts  with subjective  beliefs about the individual  strategies  used by 
each of his opponents.  He then uses these beliefs to compute his own optimal 
strategy. The strategies used for play, and for describing  beliefs about an 
opponent's play, are behavior ones. Thus, they allow randomization  in the 
choices of periods' actions (Section 3.4 elaborates on this topic and Kuhn's 
theorem,  i.e., the fact that a probability  distribution  over many  strategies  can be 
replaced by a single behavior one). It is important  to note that, unlike the 
stronger  notion of rationalizable  strategies (see Bernheim  (1986) and Pearce 
(1984)), the knowledge  assumptions  implicit in the definition  of a subjectively RATIONAL  LEARNING  1021 
rational strategy are weak. In order to choose  one, a player must only know his 
own payoff matrix and discount parameter, but need  not have any information 
about opponents'  payoff matrices, nor assume anything about their rationality. 
The  main message  of  the  paper is the  following. If the  players start with a 
vector of subjectively rational strategies, and if their individual subjective beliefs 
regarding  opponents'  strategies  are  "compatible  with  the  truly  chosen 
strategies,"  then  they  must  converge  in  finite  time  to  play  according  to  an 
E-Nash equilibrium of  the  repeated  game,  for  arbitrarily small  E.  Moreover, 
their  Bayes-updated  posterior  subjective beliefs  regarding future  play of  the 
game will become  accurate with time. In other words, they will learn to predict 
the future play of the game and to play E-Nash equilibrium for arbitrarily small 
E. Some features and assumptions of the model should be emphasized. 
1. The players' objective is to maximize, relative to their individual subjective 
beliefs,  their long term expected  discounted  payoff. Learning is not  a goal  in 
itself  here but is, rather, a consequence  of overall individual payoff maximiza- 
tion plans. Learning is acquired as the real game progresses. In this sense it may 
be  thought  of  as  learning  by playing, paralleling  the  economic  literature  on 
"learning by doing" (see Arrow (1962)). 
2.  Learning takes  place  through Bayesian  updating of  the  individual prior 
beliefs.  This follows the traditional approach of games of incomplete  or imper- 
fect information, e.g., Kuhn (1953), Harsanyi (1967), and Aumann and Maschler 
(1967).  However,  since  the  use  of  Bayesian  updating  is  a  consequence  of 
expected  utility maximization,  assumption  2  is  already  a  consequence  of  as- 
sumption 1. 
3. We depart from the standard assumptions of game theory by not requiring 
that the players have full knowledge of each others' strategies, nor do they have 
commonly known prior distributions on the unknown parameters of the game. 
(We do not prohibit such assumptions but they are not necessary in our model.) 
Rather,  we  replace  these  assumptions  by  a  weaker  one  of  compatibility  of 
beliefs  with the truth. This assumption requires that players' subjective beliefs 
do not assign zero probability to events that can occur in the play of the game. 
In mathematical language, this means that on future play paths, the probability 
distribution induced by the chosen strategies must be absolutely continuous with 
respect  to  the  probability distributions  induced  by the  private beliefs  of  the 
players, i.e., any positive probability set of paths must be assigned some positive 
probability by each player. As  an example, one  may think of a situation where 
the beliefs about an opponent's strategy assign a small positive probability to the 
strategy actually chosen.  In this case, we say that the beliefs contain a grain of 
truth, and compatibility of the beliefs with the truth is assured. Further discus- 
sion of these assumptions and their necessity will follow in subsequent sections. 
An  important corollary to the main result of this paper deals with Harsanyi- 
Nash equilibria of an n-person infinitely repeated game under discounting with 
n-sided  incomplete  information  about  opponents'  payoff matrices.  Assuming 
that the number of possible payoff matrices is finite or countable,  the grain of 
truth condition  stated above is satisfied. It follows that at such an equilibrium 1022  E.  KALAI  AND  E.  LEHRER 
the players will eventually play according to  an E-Nash equilibrium  of  the 
infinitely  repeated realized game (the one with complete information)  as if the 
uncertainties  were not present.  This corollary  and its relation  to Jordan's  (1991) 
results  will be discussed  later in this paper. 
As mentioned earlier, myopic  theories of simultaneous  learning  involve  fun- 
damental  difficulties  due to the fact that what is being learned  keeps changing. 
If players  assume  that their opponents'  actions  are fixed,  yet the opponents,  too, 
learn and change their own actions as a result of what they learn, inconsisten- 
cies are likely  to occur. Indeed, as is shown,  for example,  by Kirman  (1983) and 
by Nyarko  (1991),  learning  may  never  converge  or, worse  yet, it may  converge  to 
false beliefs. Dynamic approaches,  like the one taken in this paper, have the 
potential to overcome this difficulty.  They attempt to learn the strategies  (or, 
more precisely, the reaction rules that guide the opponents), of the infinitely 
repeated  game. These strategies,  which do not change, already  contain  the fixed 
learning  rules. 
Also, existing results of game theory suggest learning  to play Nash equilib- 
rium  in a repeated  game should  be easier than in a one shot game. Considering 
the extreme case with completely  patient players, i.e., discount factor equals 
one, the folk theorem tells us that all feasible individually  rational  payoffs  are 
Nash payoffs.  This suggests  that many,  yet certainly  not all, play paths are Nash 
paths. Thus, our result regarding  convergence  to Nash paths seems to be more 
meaningful  for moderate  or low discount  parameters. 
A second difficulty,  associated  with learning  models, concerns experimenta- 
tion. In order to avoid getting stuck at suboptimal  solutions, a well designed 
process should  occasionally  try randomly  generated  experimentation.  For exam- 
ple, the randomly  generated mutants in the evolutionary  models play such a 
role. However, as can be seen in Fudenberg  and Kreps (1988), in a rational 
choice model the optimal determination  of when and how to experiment  is 
difficult. The  subjectively  rational approach suggested here overcomes this 
difficulty:  every action in  the  current model, including experimentation,  is 
evaluated  according  to its long run contribution  to expected utility.  And maxi- 
mization, relative to  posterior probability  distribution  regarding  opponents' 
strategies,  yields well defined criterion  for determining  choices. Thus, a player, 
with a given discount parameter,  will experiment  when he assesses that the 
information  gained  will contribute  positively  to the present  value of his expected 
payoff. Given the strategic nature of the interaction  in our model, for some 
subjective  beliefs regarding  opponents' strategies, a player may find it in his 
interest to choose randomly  when and how to experiment.  While, in general, 
optimal  experimentation  computed  against  subjective  beliefs does not lead to an 
individually  optimal solution (see  the multi-arm  bandit example in the last 
section), it does so in the current paper due to the special assumptions  of 
perfect monitoring  and knowledge  of own payoff  matrices. 
In addition to perfect monitoring,  knowledge of own payoff matrices, and 
compatibility  of beliefs with the truth, our model contains several additional 
restrictive  assumptions.  Independence of strategies is imposed in two places. RATIONAL  LEARNING  1023 
First, it is implicitly assumed that players' actual strategies are chosen indepen- 
dently.  In  other  words,  players'  choices  cannot  depend  on  random  events 
(unless  they  are  completely  private)  since  such  dependencies  may  lead  to 
correlated strategies, which are assumed away in the model. But this assumption 
of independence  is also imposed on the subjective beliefs of the players. In his 
beliefs  regarding opponents'  strategies,  a  player assumes  that  the  opponents 
choose  their strategies independently of each other. 
Also,  the  assumption  that  players maximize their  expected  payoffs is  quite 
strong for infinitely repeated games. While this assumption is common in game 
theory and economics, the solution of such a maximization problem, in infinitely 
repeated games, may be very demanding. 
Our preliminary studies regarding the  relaxation of the various assumptions 
above,  with  the  exception  of  truth-compatible  beliefs,  indicate  that  bounded 
learning will lead  the players to correlated equilibrium (see  Kalai and Lehrer 
(1992)) rather than Nash equilibrium. The need  and possibilities of relaxing the 
truth compatibility assumption are discussed in several of the next sections. 
Our proof of the convergence to playing an E-Nash equilibrium is divided into 
three steps. The first establishes  a general self-correcting property of Bayesian 
updating. This is a modified version of the seminal Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) 
result about merging of opinions. We  give an independent  easy proof of their 
result and an alternative characterization of their notion of merging. 
When  applied  to  our  model,  the  self-correcting  property  shows  that  the 
probability distributions describing the players' beliefs  about the future play of 
the game must converge to the true distribution. In other words, the beliefs and 
the real play become  realization equivalent. At such time all learning possibili- 
ties have been exhausted. Remaining disagreement of the beliefs  and the truth 
may only exist off the play path, and therefore will never be observed. We refer 
to such a situation of no further learning as subjective equilibrium. The notion 
of such an equilibrium and the fact that it may yield play different from Nash 
equilibrium were observed earlier in models  of dynamic optimization, e.g., the 
multi-arm  bandit  literature  (see,  for  example,  Rothchild  (1974)),  and  in  a 
repeated  game  set-up  by  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  (1988).  Also,  in  a  different 
learning model developed independently of ours, Fudenberg and Levine (1993b) 
developed  and  studied  a closely  related  notion  called  self-confirming equilib- 
rium. We refer the reader to Battigalli et al. (1992) for a survey of the history of 
this concept. 
The last step of the proof shows that in our model, the behavior induced by a 
subjective equilibrium, and even its perturbed versions, approximates the behav- 
ior of an E-Nash equilibrium. Since this last step has independent  interest of its 
own, and since proving it involves long computations not related to learning, we 
leave it to a companion paper (see  Kalai and Lehrer (1993a)). 
Section 2 of this paper contains examples and additional elaborations on the 
approach taken  and the  assumptions made.  The  reader can skip it  and move 
directly to Sections 3 and 4 which contain the formal presentation of the model 
and of the main results. Section 5 is devoted  to the self-correcting property of 1024  E.  KALAI  AND  E.  LEHRER 
false priors by means of Bayesian updating. Section  6 contains applications to 
repeated games with incomplete information and the relation to Jordan's (1991) 
results.  Finally,  in  Section  7,  we  give  further  elaborations  on  some  of  the 
assumptions and possible extensions. 
2.  EXAMPLES  AND  ELABORATION 
In the two person games that follow, we will sometimes refer to player 1, PI, 
as he, and to player 2, Pll,  as she. 
Example 2.1: Infinitely  Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Games 
As usual for these  games, we will denote  the possible actions for each of the 
two players in each stage of the  game by A-to  describe aggressive behavior, 
and by  C-to  describe cooperative  behavior. The  following matrix represents 
the stage payoffs to PI as a function of pairs of action choices: 
PII 
A  C 
PI  A|ja 
C  d  b 
As  usual,  we  assume  that  a > b > c > d.  PI  uses  a  discount  parameter  A1 
(0 < A1  <  1) to evaluate infinite streams of payoffs. We use the convention that 
A1 close  to  0 describes an impatient (myopic) player. Pll  has a similar payoff 
matrix and  discount  parameter but  not  necessarily  with  the  same  numerical 
values as the ones of PI. We assume here, as we do throughout this paper, that 
each player knows his own parameters, and that the game is played with perfect 
monitoring.  That  is,  prior  to  making  the  choice  in  every  stage,  a  player  is 
informed of all the choices made by both players in all previous stages. 
Departing from the traditional game theoretic approach, we do not explicitly 
model  a  player's knowledge  about  the  parameters  (payoff matrices,  discount 
parameters, etc.) of his opponent.  Instead, a player starts with prior subjective 
beliefs,  described by a probability distribution, over the strategies his opponent 
will use. We assume that a player uses any specific knowledge he has about his 
opponent  in creating these beliefs. 
To illustrate such beliefs we consider a countable  set of (pure) strategies  gt 
for  t = 0, 1,2,...,  oc,  defined  as  follows.  g.,  is  the  well-known  (grim)  trigger 
strategy. This strategy prescribes cooperation initially and after fully cooperative 
histories, but "triggers" to the aggressive action after every history that contains 
any aggression by either of the two players. For  t < o?, gt coincides with  g,.  at 
all  histories  shorter  than  t  but  prescribes  the  aggressive  action  A  after  all 
histories of  length  t  or more.  In other words, if not  triggered earlier,  gt  will 
prescribe unprovoked aggression starting from time t on. With this convention, 
go is the constant aggressive strategy. RATIONAL  LEARNING  1025 
Suppose PI believes that Pll  is likely to cooperate by playing her grim trigger 
strategy; but he  also believes  there  are positive probabilities that she will stop 
cooperating earlier for other reasons. More precisely, he will assign her strate- 
gies  go, gl,...,  go  probabilities p = (.6o,  P1,...  , f3O)  that sum to 1 and with each 
f3 > 0. Depending  on his own parameters he chooses a best response strategy of 
the form  gT  for some  T1 = 0, 1,...  or mo.  Pll  holds similar beliefs,  represented 
by  a  vector  a,  about  PI's  strategy,  and  chooses  a  strategy  gT2 as  her  best 
response.  Now  the  game will really be  played  according to  the  two strategies 
(gTl'  gT2). 
It is easy to see that the beliefs are compatible with the chosen strategies. All 
positive  probability  events  in  the  game,  e.g.,  cooperation  up  to  time  t < 
min(T1,T2),  aggression  in  all  times  exceeding  the  min(T1,T2),  are  assigned 
positive  probability by the  original beliefs  of  both  players. Thus,  the  results 
described earlier must hold. 
Indeed,  learning  to  predict  the  future  play  must  occur.  If,  for  instance, 
T1  < T2, then from time T1 + 1 on, Pll  Bayesian updated beliefs  regarding PI's 
choice will assign probability 1 to his choice of gTl and she will predict correctly 
the future noncooperative play. PI, on the other hand, will never fully know her 
strategy since he would only know that T2 > T1. But he will still be able to infer 
the forthcoming noncooperative  play. This should clarify the point that players 
do not learn the strategy of their opponent  off the play path; they only learn to 
predict actual future play against the strategy they themselves use. Also  notice 
that accuracy of the above predictions did not rely on T1 and T2 being optimal 
choices.  It only  relied  on  correct updating of  the  truth-compatible  subjective 
beliefs. 
A  second  point  to  emphasize  is  that  players'  beliefs  will  not  necessarily 
coincide with the truth after a finite time; beliefs may only converge to the truth 
as  time  goes  by without  ever  coinciding  with  it.  Suppose,  for  example,  that 
T, = T2 = oo. Now  the  only resulting play path  is  the  totally cooperative  one. 
After playing it for t periods, PI, for example, will infer that she did not choose 
gO, g1, . . .,  gt  and  his  Bayesian  updated  belief  will  assign  probabilities 
(t  + 1, . . .  t  1)/,+lr  to her remaining  strategies:  (gt+ 1,  . . ., go). Since PI > 0, 
after sufficiently long time, his posterior probability I3/Et+1,Pr  will be arbitrar- 
ily close to one  and he will be almost certain that she chose  T2  =  ?? 
The  second  main result, regarding convergence  to Nash equilibrium play, is 
also easily seen in this example. The only two play paths that can survive after a 
long play are those  generated  by Nash  equilibrium (and hence  also by ?-Nash 
equilibrium). The totally aggressive path results from Nash equilibria regardless 
of the parameters of the game. But if the discount parameters are "generous," 
then  the  totally cooperative  play path can also be obtained  at a Nash  equilib- 
rium. Notice, however, that the overall play of these subjectively rational players 
can  be  of  a  type  not  generated  by  any  Nash  equilibrium,  or  even  ?-Nash 
equilibrium for small  8.  For example, the  path that is fully cooperative  up to 
time 3 and not cooperative  afterwards cannot be the outcome  of any Nash, or 
small E-Nash, equilibrium. But such a path will be generated  by the players if 1026  E.  KALAI  AND  E.  LEHRER 
their  subjective individual beliefs  assign high probability to  the  opponent  not 
cooperating  at time  4.  Nevertheless,  as follows  from our second  main result, 
from a certain time  on  these  players will follow  an  E-Nash equilibrium path. 
Thus, if the true parameters of the game allow only the totally aggressive Nash 
equilibrium (and hence  the only path compatible with arbitrarily small E-Nash 
equilibrium is the totally aggressive one),  then  at least one  of the  Ti's must be 
finite, and eventually constant mutual aggression must emerge. If, on the other 
hand, the  game's parameters permit trigger strategies  as a Nash  equilibrium, 
then  it  is  also  possible  that  both  Ti's are  infinite  and  the  play path  follows 
cooperation throughout. 
It is easy to  observe in this example that players who  hold optimistic prior 
probabilities (high  a.  and I3O)  will follow a cooperative path while pessimistic 
players  must  eventually  follow  a  noncooperative  path.  Thus,  in  the  case  of 
multiple equilibria, initial prior beliefs determine the final choice. 
Example 2.2: Absolute Continuity  and Grain of Truth  Assumptions 
In  Example  2.1,  each  player's  private  beliefs  assigned  a  strictly  positive 
probability to the strategy actually chosen by the opponent. This condition, that 
beliefs regarding opponent's strategies contain a grain of truth, is stronger than 
needed. 
Suppose, for instance, that in Example 2.1, Pll's  beliefs,  given by the vector 
a  =  (ao, a1,..  ., a.),  had sufficiently low values of all at's with t <  oo to allow the 
trigger strategy g.  as her best  response.  Then  the  well-known tit-for-tat (tft) 
strategy  (where  she  starts  by  cooperation  and  then  proceeds  to  mimic  her 
opponent's  last move)  can  also  be  chosen  as a best  response.  If  she  actually 
chooses tft as her strategy, then PI's beliefs about her strategy do not contain a 
grain  of  truth,  given  that  his  beliefs  assign  probability  zero  to  nontrigger 
strategies.  Yet  his beliefs  regarding future play paths will contain  a grain of 
truth.  Consider  the  play  paths  zo, z1,...,  z.  with  zt  describing  the  path  in 
which both players cooperate  up to time  t, he cooperates  and she aggresses at 
time t, and both aggress from time t + 1. If PI's beliefs about PII's strategy are 
described by the vector ,3 as in Example 2.1, and in response he chooses  g.  for 
himself,  then  his  induced  beliefs  on  the  future  play  paths  are  given  by  a 
distribution /11 which assigns probability Bt to each of the paths zt.  Given both 
of  their  choices,  the  true  distribution  on  future  play  paths,  ,L,  will  assign 
probability one to the path  z.,.  We now can write /11  = EjL  + (1 -  E),I  for some 
probability distribution  i  and with  8  =  f3  > 0. When this is the case, i.e., when 
the belief  distribution on future play paths assigns positive weight to the  true 
distribution, we  say that  the beliefs on play paths contain a grain of truth. This 
last condition, which is weaker than the belief on strategies containing a grain of 
truth, is also sufficient for our main result. 
The sufficient condition we end up using is weaker yet. We require that each 
player's belief  distribution on  play paths, ,2i, not  rule out  positive probability 
events according to the real probability distribution, I,.  That is, there should be RATIONAL  LEARNING  1027 
no event in the play of the infinite  game which can occur, i.e., has a IL positive 
probability,  yet be ruled  out by the beliefs of an individual  player,  i.e., has a zero 
probability  according  to /2I. In mathematical  language,  we require that ,u be 
absolutely continuous with respect to each /2I (A <<?/1). 
To understand the difference between the grain of  truth conditions and 
absolute continuity  it is useful to consider behavior  and mixed strategies,  i.e., 
ones that allow for randomization  in the choice of actions and strategies  (the 
next section contains a more detailed discussion  of Kuhn's  theorem and these 
notions). Suppose PI's beliefs about Pll's strategy  are as in Example  2.1 with 
Pt  =  (1/3)t?1  for t < o  and f0  = 1/2.  Suppose that his choice in response to 
these beliefs is to play g..  His induced beliefs on the future play paths, ,L1, 
assign probability (1/3)t+  1 to each of the paths  zt  with t < 00 and 1/2  to  z0,. If, 
unlike his beliefs, she  chooses to  randomize over the  choices of  gt  with 
probabilities  (1/2)t+1  (zero probability  on  g,),  then the real distribution  on 
future play paths,  At, assigns probability (l/2)t+l  to  each  of  the paths  zt  and 
zero to z..  It is easy to check that /11 cannot  be written  as E?t +  (1 -  E)  with a 
positive E for any probability  distribution  ,u. Thus, even his beliefs about play 
paths do not contain a grain of truth. Yet the absolute continuity  condition 
holds. Every  event in the play of the game that has A-positive  probability,  i.e., 
contains some paths zt  with finite t, is assigned a positive probability  by the 
belief distribution  /11. Thus, the results of this paper regarding  learning and 
convergence  to Nash equilibrium  must hold. 
In the above example,  however,  if PI assigned  probability  one to her playing 
g., yet she randomized  on gt with probability  (1/2)t+1  and probability  zero on 
g.,, then the absolute  continuity  condition  would fail. And, indeed, learning  and 
convergence  to Nash equilibrium  would fail, too. 
Example 2.3: On the Limitation of the Absolute Continuity  Assumption 
Consider  a repeated  game  with PI having  to choose between l and r in every 
stage. Suppose  Pl1 believes that PI flips a coin to choose l with probability  1/2 
and r with probability  1/2  after every  history.  This means  that Pl1 believes that 
future  plays  of PI are independent  of his past actions  and learning  from  the past 
is hopeless. Even if PI played  the constant  strategy  L, always  playing  1,  Pl1 will 
not learn it since, given her initial beliefs, she will always  dismiss  long chains  of 
l's  as random outcomes. Notice that this is a situation where the absolute 
continuity assumption  is violated. The event "l will be played forever" has 
probability  one but is assigned  probability  zero in the beliefs of Pll. 
The discussion  above shows  that, without  the absolute  continuity  assumption, 
or other assumptions  that connect the future to the past, learning  in general 
cannot take place. We know, however, that weaker assumptions  suffice for 
approximate  learning and for convergence  of measures in a weak sense. As- 
sume, for example,  that player  one plays a constant behavior  strategy  by which 
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game. Pll  knows that this is the type of strategy PI uses but does not know the 
value of  A. She assumes that PI chose  A according to a uniform distribution on 
the  interval  [0, 1].  Now,  Pll's  beliefs  do  not  satisfy  the  absolute  continuity 
assumption,  which  can  be  seen  by  considering  the  event  that  the  long  run 
average of  l's is A (it has probability one but is assigned probability zero by the 
diffused beliefs  of  Pll).  However,  after  long  enough  play Pll  will be  able  to 
approximate the true A and have a fairly accurate prediction of PI's near future 
play.  Section  7  contains  discussion  on  weak  learning  and  the  possibility  of 
weakening the absolute continuity assumption. 
Example 2.4: Learning and Teaching 
While this paper presents a theory of learning, it does not put the players in a 
passive  state  of  learning.  The  following  example  shows  that  optimizers, who 
believe their opponents are open to learning, may find it in their own interest to 
act as teachers. 
We  consider  a  two  person  infinite  symmetric version  of  a  "chicken game" 
described as follows. Simultaneously, at the beginning and with perfect monitor- 
ing  after  every  history,  each  player  chooses  to  "yield"  (Y)  or  "insist"  (I). 
However, once  a player yields (chooses  Y)  he has to continue yielding forever. 
The stage game payoffs are the following: 
PII 
y  I 
PIY FYT7Y]2  P  I 
|2,1 
|  -1  -1| 
Infinite payoff streams are evaluated with discounting. We denote the individual 
pure  strategies  of  this  game  by so, sl,...,  s.  with  s,  indicating  the  one  that 
prescribes the initial yielding at time t. 
Notice  that this game differs from the  prisoners' dilemma example in some 
important ways. First, the stage game has no dominant strategies and it contains 
two symmetric pure strategy equilibria. Also, the repeated game contains exactly 
two pure strategy Nash equilibria, the one where he yields immediately and she 
insists forever (so, s.)  and the symmetrically reversed one  (s.,  so). (In addition, 
subgames following mutual simultaneous yield actions contain the mutual yield 
forever equilibrium of  these  subgames.) While  technically this game is not  an 
infinitely repeated one, due to the absorbing nature of the action Y, the results 
of this paper still hold and offer interesting insights. 
We assume as in the prisoners' dilemma example that PI's beliefs, about Pll's 
strategy, are given by a vector ,3 = (  .1'...  ,f3j  and, also, that Pll's  beliefs 
about PI are given by a similar vector, a.  Putting himself partially in her shoes, 
PI may think that she is equally likely to wait any number of the first n periods 
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probability  E because, unlike him, she assigns  a very large loss to ever yielding. 
Such thinking  will lead him to  a prior beliefs vector of the type /3 = ((1 - 
8)/n,  . . . , (1 -  8)/n,  0, O,  . . ., 8).  If the future is important enough to PI, his best 
response  to /3 would  be to wait n periods  in case she yields  first,  but if she does 
not, then yield himself at time n + 1. Interpreted according  to the thought 
process  that led him to the choice of vector 3, he reasons  that as long as she is 
willing  to find out about  him, he will try  to convince  her by his actions  that he is 
indeed tough. 
If both players adopt such reasoning, a pair of strategies  (sT1, sT2)  will be 
chosen. In cases of the type T1  = 0 and T2> 0, there was no attempt  to teach on 
the part of PI and the resulting  play is as in some Nash equilibrium  of the 
infinite  game. But in cases of the form 0 < T' < T2, PI failed in his attempt  to 
teach her. The resulting play paths, with real initial fighting segments and 
continuing  with his yielding,  could not be justified  by any Nash equilibrium  or 
E-Nash equilibrium  with  small  8.  Similarly, when  T7 > T2> 0,  we  obtain  a 
non-Nash equilibrium  path with him winning.  In any of the cases, however,  as 
the main results  of this paper state, both players  will learn to predict  the future 
play and end up playing  a Nash equilibrium  in sufficiently  late subgames. 
3.  THE  MODEL  AND  ASSUMPTIONS 
3.1.  The Repeated Game 
A group  of n players  are about  to play an infinitely  repeated  game.  The stage 
game is described  by the following  components. 
1. n finite sets  1V V2'  .  ..,  XYn of  actions with  X =nx  1.i  denoting the set of 
action combinations. 
2. n payoff functions ui: X  R. 
We  let  H,  denote  the  set of histories of length t,  t = 0, 1,  2,...  (i.e.,  Ht = Xtg 
with X0 being a singleton  consisting  of the null history).  Denote by H = U tHt 
the set of all (finite) histories.  A (behavior)  strategy  of player i is a function fi: 
H -(>  A(0)  with A(Xi) denoting  the set of probability  distributions  on Xi. Thus, 
a strategy  specifies how a player randomizes  over his choices of actions after 
every  history. 
We assume  that each player  knows  his own payoff  function  and that the game 
is played with perfect monitoring,  i.e., the players  are fully informed  about all 
realized  past action combinations  at each stage. 
3.2.  Infinite Play Paths 
Let f = (fl,  . . . , fn) be a vector of behavior strategies. At the first stage player 
i  plays fi(h0),  where ho stands for the null history. Notice that fM(h0) is a 
probability  distribution  over his set of  actions. Denote by zJ(=zR(fd)), the 
realization of  fi(h0)  and by z1  the realized action combination,  i.e.,  z1 = 
(z1,...,  zn). Player  i  is  paid  x'  =  ui(z1)  and  receives  the  datum  z1  (he  is 1030  E.  KALAI  AND  E.  LEHRER 
informed of the realized action combination).  At the second stage player i 
randomizes  over his actions according  to fi(zl).  Denote by z7  and by z2  the 
realized  action of player i at the second stage and the realized  action combina- 
tion, respectively.  The payoff  of player  i is x  =  u (z2) and he is informed  of z2. 
The game proceeds in this fashion infinitely  many times. The infinite vector 
(z1,  z2, . . . ) of action combinations  is the realized  play  path. 
The procedure  described  above  defines  a probability  distribution,  EAf,  induced 
by the strategy  vector f, on the set of infinite  play paths.  First (with some abuse 
of notation),  Iuf is defined  inductively  for finite histories  h E H. Itf of the empty 
history is  1 and  tf (ha) =  ,Lf(h) xifi(h)(ai).  In other words, the probability of 
the history  h followed  by an action  vector a being played  is the probability  of h 
times the product  of the ai's being selected by the individual  fi(h)'s. 
In the set of  infinite  play paths, LX, the event history h being played is 
described  by the cylinder  set C(h), consisting  of all paths  with initial  segment h. 
Thus  f  induces  a probability 1.tf(C(h)) (the probability of  the history h) to  all 
such cylinder  sets. Following  the standard  construction  of probability  theory,  we 
let $t  denote the a-algebra  generated  by the cylinder  sets of the histories  of 
length t, and Y,  the a-algebra  used for 2X0,  is the smallest  one containing  all 
t's.  The  probability distribution ,1tf, defined on  (XX,  F),  is  the  unique 
extension  of Itf from the  t's  to  . 
3.3.  The Payoffs 
Let Ai, 0 < Ai  <  1, be the discount  factor of player i. Recall that xt denotes 
player i's payoff  at stage t. If the strategy  vector f  is played,  then the payoff  of 
player i in the repeated game is defined  by 
Ui(f)  =  (1  -Ai)  Ef  (xt+  )At, 
t=O 
where Ef denotes the expected  value calculated  with respect to the probability 
measure,  ILf, induced  by f = (f1,.,  fn). 
Notice  that Ui(f)  can be written also as (1 -  Ai)f[Ex  'At]  dAf. 
3.4.  Behavior and Beliefs 
In order to play the infinite  game, each player i chooses a behavior  strategy 
fi. In addition, player i  has a joint strategy  fi  =  (f  f2,  ... ,  fni)  describing  his 
beliefs about the strategies adopted by his opponents. Thus, f,  denotes the 
behavior strategy that player i  thinks player j  will follow. We will assume 
throughout  this paper that players know their own choice of stiategies, i.e., 
fii =f. 
As  usual, we  say that a  strategy of  player i,  fi,  is  a  best response to 
f-i  =  (fl,*.* , fi- 1,  fi  1 ...  ,  fn)  if  U(if  f,  fi) < 0 for all strategies fi 
of player i. We say that fi is an e-best response (E  > 0) if the same inequality 
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Suppose  that f  and g are two vectors  of individual  behavior  strategies  in the 
repeated game, with lIf  and Ag denoting the distributions  over infinite play 
paths induced  by f  and g, respectively.  The measure  Alf is said to be absolutely 
continuous  with  respect  to  (w.r.t.)  jlg  (denoted  by  t<<  ?  g)  if  every  event 
having  a positive  measure  according  to Af also has a positive  measure  according 
to btg. Formally, Alf(A) > 0 implies jutg(A)  > 0 for every measurable set A c$. 
If  ?f  <  lg  we also say that f  is absolutely continuous w.r.t. g. 
It is important  to expand on the assumption  that the beliefs player i holds 
regarding  player  j's strategy  are described  by a single behavior  strategy  fj. This 
represents  no serious  restriction  because the well-known  Kuhn's  (1953)  theorem 
(see also Selten (1975)) assures us that if player i's beliefs were given by a 
probability  distribution  over behavior  strategies  of player j, then these beliefs 
could be replaced  by an equivalent  single behavior  strategy.  Since beliefs are a 
central  topic of this paper, and since Kuhn's  equivalent  behavior  strategies  use 
in their construction  Bayesian  updating,  another  central  topic to this paper,  we 
briefly  review  this construction. 
Suppose player i  believes that player j  will play the behavior strategy  f, r 
with probability  Ar,  r = 1,  . . ., 1. A Kuhn's  equivalent  behavior  strategy  fji will 
choose the action a after the history  h with probability 
fj1(h)(a)  =Y  (Arlh)fi  r(h)(a) 
with ArIh  being the posterior  probability  Of  fj  r  having  been chosen given the 
observed  history  h, i.e., 
ArIh =  Aryfj, r(h)/EAw7fw(h)h 
w 
where qf (h) denotes the probability  of h being reached  when all players  other 
than j  tAke  the actions leading to h with probability  one, and player  j mixes 
according to  fj  r.  (In  the  case  that  7rf, (h) = 0  for  w = 1, . . ., 1, fji(h)  can be 
chosen arbitrarily.) 
Kuhn's equivalence is strong. Playing against the strategies (f; r)r with the 
probabilities  (Ar)r  and playing against an equivalently  constructed behavior 
strategy  fj  generate identical  probability  distributions  on the future play paths 
of the game (and hence also all positive probability  subgames).  We refer the 
reader to Aumann  (1964) for the infinite  version of Kuhn's  theorem. 
It is important  to emphasize  here an assumed  restriction  on the nature  of the 
beliefs. Player  i believes that different  opponents,  say, j and k, are described  by 
individual strategies f1i and fk.  In evaluating the probabilities  of  potential 
histories,  he uses the product  of the probabilities  induced  by such strategies.  In 
other words, he believes that players j  and k  choose their actions indepen- 
dently. This rules out important  cases where player i believes that j and k's 
strategy  choices are correlated-for  example, they both depend on the same 
random  event whose outcome he himself  does not know  (e.g., they both went to 
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they went to). Our results regarding  future play prediction  can be extended to 
these cases, but convergence  to E-Nash  equilibrium  may fail. 
4. STATEMENT  OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
Recall that by a path we mean an infinite sequence of action combinations, 
i.e.,  an element  of  .X.  For any path  z  and time  t E NJ  we  denote  by z(t)  the 
t-prefix  of z (the element in Ht consisting  of the first t action combinations  of 
z). 
DEFINITION  1: Let E  > 0 and let A and /, be two probability  measures  defined 
on the same space. We say that ,u is E-close  to ,i  if there is a measurable  set Q 
satisfying: 
(i) ,t(Q) and ,i(Q) are greater  than 1 -  E;  and 
(ii) for every  measurable  set A c Q 
(1 -c)11(A)  < I(A)  <  (1 +c)/2(A). 
Notice that this notion of c-closeness  is strong.  Unlike closeness measures  that 
depend  on differences (e.g.,  I .t(A) -  11(A)I < 8,  where ,u(A)  can equal 2,.(A) 
without  violating  the closeness requirement  for small  probability  A), our defini- 
tion requires  that any two events in Q can only differ  by a small percentage.  It 
also implies closeness of conditional  probabilities.  If A, B c Q then ,I being 
E-close  to /,  in the above sense implies that 
,u(A IB)(1  -)7(1  + 8)  < ,u(A IB) < ,u(A IB)(1  + 8)7(1  -  ). 
Thus, in the sequel where ,u represents  true probabilities  of events in the game 
and /i  represents  beliefs of a player,  being 8-close would mean that not only 
does the player assess the future correctly, he  even assesses developments 
following  small probability  histories  correctly,  provided  that he considers  paths 
in the large  set Q. This is important  since it implies  no cumulative  buildup  of an 
error  in his assessment  of the future no matter  how far. 
Being close in our sense, on a large set Q, and being close in the sense of 
differences,  as mentioned  above  but without a restriction  to a large set Q, turn 
out, however,  to be asymptotically  equivalent  notions,  as we discuss  in Section  5. 
Let f and g be two joint strategies. 
DEFINITION  2: Let 8 > 0. We say that f plays 8-like g if Itf is 8-close to ,ug. 
DEFINITION  3: Let f  be a strategy,  t e- N and h E Ht. The induced  strategy  fh 
is defined  by 
fh(h')  = f (hh')  for any h'  E Hr, 
where hh' is the concatenation  of  h with h', i.e., the history of length t + r 
whose first t  elements coincide with h followed by the r elements of  h'. If 
f = (fl, ... , fn) is a joint strategy,  fh  denotes the joint strategy  consisting  of all 
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The following theorem states that if the vector of strategies actually chosen is 
absolutely continuous w.r.t. the beliefs of a player, then the player will learn to 
accurately predict the future play of the game. 
THEOREM  1: Let f  and fi  be two n-vectors of strategies, representing  the ones 
actually chosen and the beliefs of player i, respectively. Assume that f is absolutely 
continuous w.r.t.  fi.  Then for  every  E > 0  and for  almost  every play path  z 
(according to the measure induced by f ) there is a time T (=  T(z, 8))  such that 
for all t >  T, fz(t) plays 8-like fz(t). 
In other words, after the  history z(t),  the  real probability distribution over 
the future play of the game is 8-close to what player i believes the distribution 
is. It implies that the real probability of any future history cannot differ from the 
beliefs  of player i  by more than  8.  But, as discussed earlier, it is substantially 
stronger. It implies  closeness  of  probabilities for  small events  and for  condi- 
tional probabilities. 
Notice  that,  in Theorem  1, other  than  absolute  continuity, no  assumptions 
were made on  f  and f i. Thus, it is applicable to any strategies of interest and 
not just  to  those  maximizing expected  utility.  For  instance,  if  a  player were 
following a minmax strategy and still conducting a Bayesian update,  he would 
also  learn  to  predict  the  future  play.  The  theorem  essentially  states  that 
Bayesian updating by itself will lead  to  a correct prediction of  the  important 
parts (those that determine the actual play) of other players' strategies. It does 
not state that a player would learn to predict other players' future randomiza- 
tion in response to actions that will not be taken. 
Theorem  1, by itself,  has  immediate  implications  for  theories  dealing with 
payoff maximizing players. Suppose, as Theorem 1 implies, that fz(t) plays 8-like 
fz(t)  for all  i = 1, . . ., n.  Furthermore, assume that fi  is a best response  to fl. 
Then,  after sufficiently long time: (i) each player maximizes his payoff against 
his  subjective  beliefs  and,  moreover,  (ii)  these  beliefs  are  almost  (up  to  8) 
realization equivalent to the  real strategies played. Thus, each player is maxi- 
mizing relative to (possibly false)  subjective beliefs which will never be contra- 
dicted  by  the  play  of  the  game  (even  statistically).  The  following  solution 
concept captures these  two elements. 
DEFINITION  4: An  n-vector  of  strategies,  g,  is  a  subjective 8-equilibrium if 
there is a matrix of strategies (gJ)1  <i  <  n  with g,1  = gi  such that 
(i) gi  is a best response to  gL1, i = 1, . . ., n; and 
(ii) g  plays 8-like g1, i = 1, .. ., n. 
COROLLARY  1: Let f and f 1,  f 2,. .  .,  f  nbe  vectors of strategies representing  the 
actual choice and the beliefs of the players. Suppose that for every  player i: 
(i) fi  is a best response to f  L  i; and 
(ii) f  is absolutely continuous w.r.t.  fi. 
Then for  every E > 0  and for  almost every (w.r.t.  ,Lf ) path z  there is a time T 1034  E. KALAI AND  E. LEHRER 
(= T(z, E)) such that for  all t >  T fz(t) with fzl(t),..  , fZ(t) is a subjective E-equi- 
librium. 
PROOF:  The corollary  follows immediately  from Theorem 1 when we recog- 
nize that maximizing  expected discounted  utility implies maximizing  expected 
utility after every positive probability  history  relative to the posterior  distribu- 
tion induced  by the history. 
Notice that if g  is a subjective  O-equilibrium  (or just subjective  equilibrium), 
then  ,ug, the distribution induced by g,  is identical to  yg'.  Thus, g  and g1 are 
realization  equivalent.  Despite the equivalence,  a subjective  O-equilibrium  does 
not necessarily  induce the same behavior  as a Nash equilibrium  (the one person 
multi-arm  bandit game is a well-known  example). 
However,  under the assumptions  of knowing  own payoff  matrices  and perfect 
monitoring,  or "observed-deviators"  in the language  of Fudenberg  and Levine 
(1993b), it is easy to see that identical  behavior  is induced (see also Battigalli 
et  al. (1992), for earlier versions of  this observation).  Clearly, every Nash 
equilibrium,  being a subjective  equilibrium,  induces a subjective  equilibrium 
behavior.  Conversely,  starting  with a subjective  equilibrium,  one can modify  the 
strategies  used as follows.  After histories  that are in the support  of all players' 
strategies  leave the actions  of all players  unchanged.  In subgames  that follow a 
one person deviation  from his support,  have all the players  switch  their actions 
to the ones attributed  to them by the beliefs of the deviator.  In subgames  that 
follow a multiperson  deviation assign the players any actions. It is easy to 
observe that this modification  yields a Nash equilibrium  which is realization 
equivalent  to the original  subjective  equilibrium. 
When perturbations  are introduced to  the  accuracy of  the  beliefs in  a 
subjective E-equilibrium  and to  the  accuracy  of  optimization in  an  E-Nash 
equilibrium,  the  discrepancy  between the  two concepts is  greater and the 
equivalence  of behavior  sketched  above fails for obvious  reasons  (see Kalai  and 
Lehrer (1993a) for discussion  and elaborations).  Yet, for the family of games 
studied  here, the two notions induce asymptotically  identical  behavior. 
PROPOSITION  1: For every E > 0  there is  r7  > 0 such that if g is a subjective 
ij-equilibrium  then there exists f such that 
(i) g plays c-like f,  and 
(ii) f  is an c-Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 1 will be proven in the next section. We refer the reader to Kalai 
and Lehrer  (1993a)  for the proof of Proposition  1 and for a general discussion 
on subjective  equilibrium.  Together, however, Corollary  1 and Proposition 1 
imply  our main result. 
THEOREM  2:  Let f  and f ', f 2,..  .,  f n  be strategy vectors representing  respec- 
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player i: 
(i) fi  is a best response to f i i; and 
(ii) f  is absolutely continuous with respect to fi. 
Then  for every E >  0 and for almost all (with respect to p4f  ) play paths z there is a 
time T = T(z, c)  such that for  every t >  T there exists an  c-equilibrium  f  of  the 
repeated game satisfying  fZ(t) plays E-like  f. 
In other words,  given any E > 0, with probability  one there will be some time 
T after which the players  will play c-like an E-Nash  equilibrium.  This means 
that if utility maximizing  players start with individual  subjective  beliefs, with 
respect to which the true strategies  are absolutely  continuous,  then in the long 
run, their behavior  must be essentially  the same as a behavior  described  by an 
c-Nash equilibrium.  In the last section of the paper, we show that by using a 
weaker  version  of closeness  of behavior  one can replace  the c-Nash equilibrium 
in Theorem  2 by the usual Nash equilibrium. 
5.  BAYESIAN  LEARNING 
Our main result, Theorem  2, combines  two issues:  (i) Bayesian  updating  and 
(ii) payoff maximization.  In this section, we concentrate  on the first one and 
prove Theorem 1. In fact, the treatment  of Bayesian  updating,  given here, is 
applicable to  issues that lie beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is 
referred to Kalai and Lehrer (1990a, b and 1993b) and Monderer  and Samet 
(1990). 
Suppose  that (Q, F)  is a measure  space interpreted  as the set of states of the 
world.  Let {9Dt}t  be an increasing  sequence  of finite or countable  partitions  of (2 
(i.e.,  ?t ?1  refines qt).  Ot  is interpreted  as the information  available  at time t. 
In other words, at time t  the agent is informed  of the part Pt(o) E qt  that 
contains the prevailing state  wtE  E  2. 
We assume that the  o-field  F  is the smallest one that contains all the 
elements of all the  1jt's. 
The agent's  initial  belief about the distribution  of states of nature  is denoted 
by ,i (a o-additive  measure  defined on (12, F)).  However,  the real distribution 
is given by a measure  ,ut.  Our task in this section is to show that the subjective 
probability  (the belief) converges  to the real one as information  increases. 
Denote the field generated  by 9n by ,K. The next theorem  is a restatement 
of Theorem  1 but in the language  of partitions.  It is essentially  equivalent  to the 
Blackwell  and Dubins (1962) theorem discussed  later. 
THEOREM  3:  Let  p. <<  ?p7.  With ,u-probability 1,  for  every c > 0  there is  a 
random time r(c)  such that for  all r > r(E), I.Q IPPr(())  is c-close to Aib IPr(w)). 
PROOF:  Theorem  3 is a consequence  of Proposition  2 and Lemma  1 (see also 
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PROPOSITION  2:  Suppose that  ,  <<  ,  (i.e.,  ,(A)  > 0  implies ,1(A) > 0  for 
every A E  Y).  With ,A-probability  1 for  every 8 > 0  there is a random variable 
t(E) such that for every s > t >  t(s): 
(1)  1  (  <  (  1+8. 
PROOF:  Since ,  <<?fi,  by the Radon-Nikodym  theorem, there is an SFmea- 
surable  function 4 satisfying 
(2)  f  dii=  A(A)  forevery A E F. 
By Levy's  theorem (see Shiryayev  (1984)), EJO I  52F)  -  E(  I  F)  = 0 ,u almost 
surely  (and therefore,  ,u-a.s.).  However,  for ,i almost all w 
(3)  EO(4 I  5t  )(w)  = (1/Pi(Pt(wo)))f  +b  d/i  = A(Pt(wo)  )/f(Pt(wo)). 
Moreover,  by (2),  p  > 0 ,Ut-a.s.  Thus, the right side of (3) tends ,u-a.s. to a 
positive number. In other words, there is a  t(?)  such that for ,u-a.e. w the 
following  holds: 
(4)  1 -  s  e)  p()  <  1 + 8  for all s >  t >  t(?) 
The middle term of (4) is equal to the middle one in (1). Since (1) holds for 
every  8  > 0 with ,t-probability  1, the proposition  follows.  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 1: Let {Wt}  be an increasing  sequence of events satisfying ,tt(W) T  1. For 
every 8  >  0  there is a random time t(8)  such that any random t >  t(E)  satisfies 
4;  4WjPt(w)))>  1 -8}  =  1. 
PROOF:  J(Wy)  -t  ,1.  Thus, 1uXCt)  t X?,  where Ct =Q \  Wt. 
Suppose, to the contrary,  that the lemma does not hold. Then there is a 
,u-positive set  A  and  8 > 0  such  that  for  all  w EA,  u(Wt(I  Pt(w))  <  1 -8  for 
infinitely  many t's. 
Fix s E NJ  and define 
Br =  {w EA;r  =  min{tlt  >s  and  A(WtIPt(w))  < 1-8). 
Observe that {Br} are pairwise disjoint and, moreover, {U  E-  BPrGo,)}r  are also 
pairwise disjoint. By the definition, A =  U  r  > sBr, 
Since Cs  D Ct when t >  s, for all tO  EA,  It(CsIPPt()) >  E for infinitely many t. 
Thus,  (Cs  I  U  {E  BPt(())  >8.  Therefore,  u(Cs)  >  8A(  Ut>  U XBPt(G))> 
8AWU  t >  B)  =  El-(A). 
Hence, the sequence  {,tt(Cs)} is bounded  away  from  zero, which  is a contradic- 
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In order to apply  the lemma set 
Wt =  ; I  E(  I -s- ) (  )IE(o  I  t  )(Z)- 1 | < e  for  Vs  > t. 
An immediate corollary is a version of the main result of  Blackwell and 
Dubins (1962). 
COROLLARY  2 (see Blackwell  and Dubins (1962)): For ,u-a.e. w there  is time 
t=t(E)  such,thatforA  e=  Yand  s > t  Il(A IP()s(w)8  -  -(AIPs())I  <E. 
The converse  statement,  that the Blackwell-Dubins'  result  implies  Theorem  3, 
is also true but not obvious.  One can actually  show that the topology  generated 
by our notion of closeness is equivalent  to the one generated  by Blackwell  and 
Dubins.  That is a sequence  of  measures  us -,  in one  sense  if and only if it 
does so in the other. That our topology  is stronger  is immediate.  However,  since 
the notion used by Blackwell  and Dubins applies to all events, not just in large 
set Q, it turns  out to be as strong.  See Kalai and Lehrer  (1993b)  for details. 
Example:  One biased coin with parameter pi  is  selected with probability 
ai > 0 from a countable set of such coins. The chosen coin is tossed infinitely 
many times. An agent believes that the coin pi is drawn  with probability  f3i. 
Define f2 to be the set of infinite sequences of 0's and l's generated by the 
tosses of the coin. The probability  measure on 12, induced by {aJ}, say ,/,  is 
absolutely  continuous  with respect to the one induced by {f38},  say ,t, if pi > 0 
for all  i.  Theorem 3  states that, after sufficiently  long time, the posterior 
probability  of A will be arbitrarily  close to the posterior  one of ,u. 
REMARK:  For general probability  measures,  we say that ,i  contains  a "grain 
of truth" of ,A, if ,i  = A,u  + (1 -  A),u for some probability measure ,ii and A > 0. 
It is equivalent  to requiring  that the Radon-Nikodym  derivative,  4 = dt/di,  is 
bounded. 
Notice that in the previous  example vi contains  a grain  of truth if and only if 
aC/f3i are uniformly  bounded. 
6.  REPEATED  GAMES  WITH  INCOMPLETE  INFORMATION  AND 
JORDAN'S  RESULTS 
In  this paper uncertainties regarding other players are captured by the 
individual  beliefs a player holds about others' strategies.  This is unlike tradi- 
tional game theory where uncertainties  are expressed by a commonly  known 
prior distribution  over the unknown  parameters  of the game (payoffs,  discount 
parameters,  feasible actions,  etc.) with a commonly  known  signaling  mechanism 
that gives different players different additional information.  We proceed to 
show by example  how the traditional  approach  can be viewed as a special case 
of the current  paper. In particular,  the equilibria  of a large class of repeated 
games with incomplete information  will satisfy the assumptions  of our main 
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Consider  two players about to play an infinitely  repeated game of the type 
described earlier, but with a  randomly  generated fixed size pair of  payoff 
matrices  (Ai, Bj)(i,j)  EIXJ  We assume  that both I and J are finite or countable, 
and that the selection of the pair (i, j) will be done according  to a commonly 
known  prior probability  distribution  v  on I x J. After the selection, PI will be 
told the realized  value i and Pll will be told the realized  value j. 
In order to play the game, PI chooses a vector (f)i el  with each fi being the 
infinite  game strategy  that he would follow if he is told that his realized  payoff 
matrix  is Ai. Pll chooses a similar  vector of strategies  (gj)j  c j. A pair of such 
vectors is a Harsanyi-Nash  equilibrium  if each f1 is a best response (in long 
term discounted  utility)  against  the strategies  (gj)j =i when mixed according  to 
the conditional  distribution  on J given the realized  value i, r(j I  i), and with the 
symmetric  property  holding  for each gj (see also Hart (1985)). 
To relate such an equilibrium  to the current  paper, assume  that the random 
drawing  of the payoff matrices has been performed and that i  and j  were 
selected. Thus, the real play of the game will follow the pair of  strategies 
(fi, g1). Given his information,  PI believes that P1l will play (gj)j  j  with 
probabilities  rT(j  I  i)  and being at a Nash equilibrium  his fi  is actually  a best 
response  to this belief. Moreover,  given  the finiteness  of J, PI's belief contains  a 
grain  of truth  (i.e., assigns  positive  probability  to gj). Similarly,  Pll's choice  of gi 
is a best response to the distribution  m(i  I]) on (fi)ie,  and it also contains a 
grain  of truth. 
In the set-up above, let fi and g1  be the strategies  realized and let g and f 
be the induced  beliefs over opponent's  strategies,  e.g., g is the behavior  strategy 
obtained  by mixing  the vector (gj)jE1  j with probabilities  -(j  i). 
The analogies  of Theorem 1, Proposition  1 and Theorem  2, when applied  to 
the Harsanyi-Nash  equilibrium,  follow as immediate  corollaries. 
THEOREM  1.1: For every ? > 0  and almost every play path z  (relative to the 
distribution induced by fi, gJ) there is a time T such that for all t >  T (fl, gj)Z(t) 
plays E-like (fi, k)z(t). 
In other words, at such a Harsanyi-Nash  equilibrium  the players  eventually 
predict the future play of the game accurately  even if they do not necessarily 
learn the payoff  matrices  of their opponents. 
THEOREM  2.1:  For every E > 0 and almost every  play path z we can find a time 
T such that for  all t >  T there is an  E-Nash equilibrium  of  the realized repeated 
game (A-, B1), (f, g),  with (f1, gJ)z()  plays c-like (f,  g). 
So even if the players  do not learn the identity  of the payoff  matrices  actually 
played,  they eventually  play almost  as E-Nash  players  who do know  the identity 
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Theorem  2.1 is related to an earlier  result  of Jordan  (1991).  His players  faced 
the same uncertainty  about opponents'  payoff matrices.  His prior distribution 
about  such matrices,  however,  was more general  since he did not restrict  himself 
to a discrete set of possible matrices. On the other hand, his players played 
myopically.  In each period they played a Harsanyi-Nash  equilibrium,  updated 
on all the information  obtained earlier, as if each current  period were the last 
one. He then studied the limit beliefs about opponents'  next period actions as 
the number  of periods  became large. His main result  was that all cluster  points 
of the expectation  sequence are Nash equilibria  of the underlying  realized  stage 
game. 
Our model can be made nearly myopic by letting the discount parameter 
approach  zero. In general,  when one totally  discounts  the future, Nash equilib- 
ria of the repeated game consist of repeated plays of Nash equilibria  of the 
stage game. Thus, as a limit case when we  let  the  discounted parameters 
approach zero, our result regarding  convergence to  Nash equilibria of  the 
repeated  game confirms  Jordan's  result  of convergence  to Nash equilibria  of the 
stage game. (Of course, if the stage game had a multiplicity  of equilibria,  then 
one could see oscillation among them.) Notice, though, that Jordan obtains 
convergence  of the beliefs to Nash equilibrium,  while we obtain convergence  of 
the beliefs and the actual play to E-Nash  equilibrium. 
When considering generalizations  of Theorems 1.1 and 2.1 above to  the 
n-player case with n > 2 we observe the following.  Theorem 1.1 generalizes. 
Theorem  2.1 does not unless  we impose  an additional  independence  assumption 
on the prior  distribution  over payoff  matrices.  The condition  needed is that the 
prior distribution,  7r(i1,  i2,..  -,  in), over payoff  matrices  should be independent 
over opponents  for every  realization  of every  player  i1. For example,  for player 
1, r(i2,  ... ., inIi1)  should  be independent  over i2 through  in. 
The need for the above independence  condition arises in the application  of 
Proposition  1. As assumed  in the definition  of a subjective  E-equilibrium,  each 
player  assigns  independent  beliefs to the strategies  of his opponents.  However, 
if the prior  distribution  vr did not satisfy  the independence  condition,  one would 
not be able to replace the mixed combination  of opponent's strategies  by an 
equivalent  product of behavior strategies,  so the proposition  would not hold. 
Indeed, convergence  to 8-Nash  equilibrium  will fail. 
In order to correct for such dependencies,  we would have to generalize  the 
concept  of subjective  E-equilibrium  to allow  for correlated  beliefs. This will yield 
a concept closer to  the notion, of  self-confirming  equilibrium  developed by 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) and Fudenberg and Levine (1993b). The new 
concept will have to be defined for infinite games and will have to include a 
suitable notion of perturbation.  The convergence  of Theorem 2.1 to  8-Nash 
equilibrium is  then  likely to  be  replaced by convergence to  a  correlated 
8-equilibrium. 
7.  REMARKS 
This section includes some additional remarks about assumptions  of  the 
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7.1.  An Alternative Notion of Closeness 
As discussed  in this paper,  the notions of one measure  being close to another 
and of one strategy  vector playing  like another  are strong.  They guarantee  that 
if  f  plays E-like g,  then with probability  1 -  E, f  and g  will assign close 
probabilities  to future events and will continue to do so regardless  of how long 
the game has been played.  The result about learning  to play E-like  E-Nash  gives 
a strong  notion of proximity  to the c-Nash for the rest of the infinite  game. We 
do not know, at this time, if the same theorem  can be proven  with only one c, 
i.e.,  learning to  play c-like a  full Nash equilibrium.  However, with a  less 
demanding  notion of being close, the players  will learn to play a full, rather  than 
c, Nash equilibrium. 
For an c > 0 and a positive integer l we say that ,u is (c, 1)-close  to ,u if for 
every  history  h of length I or less I/A(h)  -  ,(h)l  < c. Similarly,  f  plays  (c, I)-like 
g  if the induced measure Itf  is (c, l)-close  to A,g. Thus, playing (c, l)-like means 
playing c  the same up to a horizon of  l  periods. It was shown in Kalai and 
Lehrer  (1993a)  that for a given c and 1, if g is a subjective  n7-equilibrium,  with 
sufficiently  small 71,  then it must play  (c, l)-like some Nash (rather  than c-Nash) 
equilibrium  of  the repeated game. So, taking this less ambitious notion of 
approximating  behavior,  we can obtain c-closeness  in finite time to a full Nash 
equilibrium.  Therefore,  Theorem  2 can be restated  as follows. 
THEOREM  2*:  Let f and f 1, f 2,.. .,  f nbe  strategy vectors representing  the one 
actually played and the beliefs of the players. Suppose that for every  player i: 
(i) fi is best response  to f f i; and 
(ii) f  is absolutely continuous w.r.t.  fi. 
Then  for every c > 0 and a positive integer I there is a time T = T(z, c, 1) such that 
for every t >  T there is a Nash equilibrium  f  of the repeated game satisfying f 
plays (c, l)-like f. 
The obvious  identical  modification  can be applied  to Theorem  2.1 as well. 
7.2.  Dispersed Beliefs and Weak  Learning 
Example 2.3 suggests that if the belief assigns a positive probability  to any 
"neighborhood"  of the real strategy,  then a "weak" learning  may take place. 
The following example shows that this is not an easy task, and that careful 
studies  of the topologies  and notions  of learning  involved  have to be conducted. 
The notion of "neighborhood"  called for by Example  2.3 is the following.  We 
say that a behavior strategy  f'  is in the c-neighborhood  of another behavior 
strategy  f  if the probabilities  they assign to any action after every history  are 
close to each other up to an E. In the following  example  we show a case where 
every neighborhood  around  the strategy  denoted below by c.  is given positive 
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As before, PI has two actions: 1 and r. Let  cn  be the stationary strategy that 
plays with probability 1 -  l/n  the action 1 and with probability l/n  the action 
r, n =  1,2, ...  , oo.  Let  dn be the strategy which plays n times 1 and r thereafter. 
Pll  believes that  cn  is played with probability an >  0 (Ean  <  1) and dn with f3n, 
while in fact PI plays constantly 1, i.e.,  c.,  which is assigned zero probability by 
Pll.  It is clear then  that Pll  ascribes positive probability to any neighborhood 
around  c..  One  might expect  that  c  's with large  n  will be  assigned growing 
probabilities in the course of the infinite game. But we will show that whether or 
not this occurs depends  on the  sequences  {an}  and {f3n}. If the  sequence  {an} 
tends to zero much faster than {f3n} even "weak" learning fails. 
After  observing  t  times  1, the  posterior  probability of  cm being  played  is 
am(1  -  1/m)t/(At  + Bt) where At = Em=  am(l  -  1/rm)t  and Bt =  2m>t/3m.  For 
sufficiently large t,  At  can be bounded from above as follows: 
[t1/2]  00 
At =E  am(l  -  1m)t  +  E  am(l  -  1m)t. 
m=l  [t1/2]  + 
The first term, 
[t1/2] 





-  (t 1/2)/2 
The last inequality is obtained by the fact that (1 -  1/[tl/2])tl/2  e-1  for large 
t's.  The second term, 
00  00 
E  am(l  -  1/m) t<  E  Cam. 
[t1/2]  +  1  [tl/2]+  1 
If am = a2-m  and a  <  1, then 
00 
E  am  <  2-[t1/2]  < 2-(t  12)/2 
[t1/2]+  1 
so that  At <  2 *  2-(t  1/2)/2.  Suppose now that  f3m  =  a/M2,  where the constant  a 
is chosen  in such a way that Em(am  +  p3m)  =  1 (a  <  1). In this case, Bt behaves 
asymptotically like  a/t.  Thus, At/Bt  approaches zero as  t  goes to infinity. We 
conclude  that  the  probability assigned  to  the  event  that  a  Cn  is  played  ap- 
proaches  zero  as more observations of  1 arrive. Thus, the  future event which 
consists of the infinite run of  l's is given smaller and smaller probability as time 
goes by. Since the strategy played by PI gives this infinite run of  l's probability 
1, we do not have here learning in the sense discussed above. Pll  does not learn 
the future behavior of PI. 
In this example, however, the updated belief assigns probability converging to 
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future behavior  of PI. In other words,  Pll learns  in a weak sense the strategy  of 
PI. 
By defining  the f,3's  a bit differently,  we can construct  an example  in which 
every  once in a while Pll will expect the next outcome  to be r with probability 
close to 1/2, while the outcome  will be always  1. On an infinite  set of integers, 
A  A 
say, M, we set Orm  =  Ek=mf3k,  while if m ? M we define Pm =  /3m  Thus, if M is 
very sparse,  the series P3m  converges  and, moreover,  P3m/Ek=m  +  3k  tends to 1 
as  m -*  oo if  attention  is  restricted to  m E M.  Now  we  define  ak  = a2`  and 
3  =  a,3m.  Once again, a is chosen in a way that E(acm +  3m')  =  1. The calcula- 
tion of  At  in this case is the same as the calculation  above. Defining B  = 
Em  >t,6'  one gets As/B  <A,/Bt.  Therefore, as the game evolves the set of 
strategies  {c,j  is getting diminishing  weight.  After a long time, when Bt is very 
close to  one  and when t =  m  for some m e M,  out of  the probability  Bt 
(assigned  to all d's) I3m  is given  to dmi which  plays r at the (m + 1)th stage.  But 
f3' /B'  is  close to  1/2.  We conclude that after m  observations  of  1, the 
prediction  of Pll regarding  the immediate  play of PI is approximately  1/2  on 1 
and 1/2  on r, while in fact PI plays 1 with probability  1. It means that Pll does 
not learn, even in the weak sense, the behavior  of PI. In other words,  Bayesian 
updating  will not lead to accurate  prediction  even of events that take place in 
the near future. 
7.3.  The Necessity of Knowing Your Own Preferences 
The assumption  that each player knows his own preferences  is crucial.  For 
example, Blume and Easley (1992) show a repeated game with incomplete 
information  where the players never converge to play an equilibrium  of the 
complete information  game. Thus, their results contradict  Theorem 2.1. The 
difference  lies in the fact that, in their example,  players  do not know their own 
payoff  matrix. 
More familiar,  perhaps,  are results regarding  the multi-arm  bandit problem 
(see,  for example, Rothschild (1974)) where an optimal Bayesian learning 
strategy  does not lead to an optimal  strategy  of the full information  case. Since 
we can view the multi-arm  bandit  problem  as a special case of the one person 
version of Corollary  1, optimal play corresponds  to a Nash equilibrium.  The 
discrepancy  between  the optimal  Bayesian  play and the optimal  full information 
play contradicts  the conclusion of Theorem 2.1, which states that the player 
should  eventually  behave E-optimally  as if the uncertainty  were not present.  The 
cause for this discrepancy  lies in our assumption  that the players know their 
own payoff matrix.  In the multi-arm  bandit problem  this assumption  requires 
that the player  know the payoffs  associated  with the different  actions,  which is 
not true for that model. 
The contrast with the multi-arm  bandit problem illustrates an important 
point. The uncertainty  in our model is regarding  strategies of the opponent. 
Unlike nature's  uncertainties,  opponents'  actions will continue to be observed 
as long as the game lasts, and thus, perfect learning  of them will take place. RATIONAL  LEARNING  1043 
7.4.  The Need for Perfect Monitoring 
Consider  again  the multi-arm  bandit  problem,  but now  view it as a two person 
game with the original  player  being player  I and nature  being player  II. We let 
Pll have a flat utility function, and his action set consists of choosing  one of a 
few possible payoff  distributions  for each one of PI's activities.  We assume  that 
Pll  made his choices randomly at  the  beginning according to  some fixed 
probability  distribution  rT, and then kept the same realized choices throughout 
the infinite  game. We also assume  that PI knows  that Pll followed the strategy 
described  above  but PI is not told the realized  payoff  choices. 
It is easy to see that now we have modeled the multi-arm  bandit  problem  as a 
two person infinite game. However,  this game has imperfect  monitoring.  Nash 
equilibria  with Pll playing  a strategy  of the type discussed  above exist, and they 
require that PI plays optimally against the  realized choices of  Pll.  Again, 
examples  of optimal  long term strategy  in the multi-arm  bandit  problem  violate 
the conclusion  of our Theorem  2.1, but under this formulation,  the discrepancy 
is explained  by the failure of the perfect monitoring  condition. 
7.5.  Extensions 
Stochastic Games: The results of  this paper should extend to  the  more 
general  model of stochastic  games (see Shapley  (1953))  under the informational 
assumptions  that each player knows his own payoff matrices as well as the 
transition  probabilities  and the state realizations  of the stochastic game. To 
what extent our results generalize  when the realized states are not told to the 
players  seems to be an interesting  problem. 
General Continuous Payoff Functions: Since  the  proof  of  Proposition  1 (in 
Kalai and Lehrer (1993a)) relies only on the continuity  of  Ui, the proof of 
Theorem  1 applies  also to repeated  games  with general  payoff  functions  that are 
continuous  with respect to the product topology:  for example, when the dis- 
count factor changes  with time. 
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